Objective: We investigated whether naturalistic, intuitive (pattern recognition-based) decision making can be developed via implicit statistical learning in a simulated real-world environment.
IntroductIon
People make decisions across a wide range of situations as they go about their daily lives. An individual may have to decide with splitsecond timing whether to take an alternate route if it appears that the typical route to work is blocked by a traffic accident. Or an individual may suddenly develop a sense of foreboding while exploring the attractions along a city street and decide not to go farther. These kinds of decisions rely on unconscious pattern recognition, which occurs in many domains of expertise, such as fighting fires, diagnosing infants with disease, and engaging an enemy during combat (Klein, 1998) .
Decision making based on situational pattern recognition is called intuitive (Klein, 1998 (Klein, , 2008 Lopes & Oden, 1991; Westcott, 1968; Zsambok & Klein, 1997) . Intuitive decision making is seen as one of two forms, or modes, of decision making in the dual-process framework (Evans, 2003 (Evans, , 2008 Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1997; Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Sloman, 1996) . Intuitive decision making involves a fast and nonconscious, nondeliberative process that is relatively effortless and not constrained by working memory limitations. The other form of decision making is called analytical. Analytical decision making refers to decision making via deliberation, a relatively slow and conscious process that is effortful and constrained by working memory limitations.
We report in this article an experimental investigation of the training of intuitive decision making in a simulated real-world environment. We induced implicit statistical learning, which was a means by which knowledge about (artificial) situational patterns was acquired, in a task that was analogous to a target pattern acquisition exercise, such as search and rescue. This knowledge was then employed in the situational pattern recognition process when intuitive decisions were made.
Implicit statistical learning, which refers to the learning of statistical regularities without full awareness of what has been learned (e.g., Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Perruchet & Pacton, 2006) , has been suggested as a means by which the foundation for intuitive decision making is developed (Hogarth, 2001; Reber, 1989 Reber, , 1993 . However, to our knowledge, no definitive studies have actually shown that implicit learning plays a causal role in the development of intuitive decision making when the latter is defined as pattern recognition of real-world, or simulated real-world, environmental situations. The main goal of our study was to investigate this claim.
Our simulated real-world (virtual) environment was composed of a naturalistic ground plane seen in perspective view with a horizon and a set of objects positioned on the ground ( Figure 1A ). We presented this environment dynamically to our participants as an expansive optic-flow motion pattern to induce the sense of observer locomotion over the ground plane and through the environment at a low altitude (Patterson et al., 2006) .
During training, we exposed our participants to a set of different, but related, versions of the dynamic environment to induce implicit learning of their common statistical structure (Patterson, Pierce, Bell, Andrews, & Winterbottom, 2009; Patterson, Pierce, Bell, & Klein, 2010) . Following training, we tested our participants on their ability to make intuitive decisions by having them perform a situational pattern recognition task involving novel (but related) versions of the dynamic environment.
The information content of the different versions of the simulated environment-that is, the sequences of objects that were encountered as the observer experienced simulated flight over the ground-could be quantified and ordered along a dimension of increasing complexity. This method was possible by using a finite-state algorithm for generating the object sequences.
A finite-state algorithm, generated by a directed graph, defined an artificial grammar for generating the content of our environment. Each transition from one state to another state in the grammar produced an object (e.g., a truck) to be positioned along the ground at a given location. Different paths through the grammar produced different sequences of objects to be encountered in the environment. The set of all such sequences, which possessed a subtle statistical dependency, defined different versions of our environment.
Employing a finite-state grammar for creating the environmental content to which our observers were exposed was analogous to the way in which artificial letter strings were generated in studies on implicit learning (Reber, 1967 (Reber, , 1989 Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980) . Creating our environmental content via a finite-state grammar allowed us to make direct contact with the implicit learning literature.
This approach also allowed us to employ topological entropy as a measure of the complexity of the content of our environment. The complexity of an artificial grammar can be equated with the topological entropy of the sequence space of a dynamical system and is computed by finding the largest non-negative eigenvalue of an associated transition matrix (Bolt & Jones, 2000) . Topological entropy is related to the exponential growth in the number of sequences that can be generated by a given grammar as sequence length increases to infinity and is indicated by the variable h.
Topological entropy was increased with more states in the algorithm and/or with more arrows or links between the states. Topological entropy provided a quantitative measure of the amount of information inherent in the content making up the different versions of our simulated environment and was used for estimating the information-processing limit for training intuitive decision making.
One training condition was of particular interest to us. Participants in our study were exposed to different versions of the simulated real-world environment in accordance with a passive training regime. During training, the participants passively viewed, during simulated flight, different sequences of objects in the environment. The participants were not instructed to learn anything, were not told where to direct their attention, did not receive feedback, and were not told that they would be tested at a later point in time.
This regime was consistent with the concept of unsupervised learning (Aslin, Saffran, & Newport, 1998; Fiser & Aslin, 2001 , in which implicit learning of statistical patterns can be unintentional and can occur without feedback. We were interested in inducing in our participants a form of passive, unsupervised implicit learning to simulate the kind of naturalistic learning that occurs in many instances as people go about their daily lives.
We wondered whether the training of intuitive decision making (a) could be accomplished via implicit learning (Experiment 1), (b) involves working memory (Experiment 2), (c) possesses an information-processing limit that could be measured (Experiment 3), and (d) demonstrates transfer to a static flat display (Experiment 4).
ExpErImEnt 1
The question of whether implicit learning could be a means by which intuitive decision making can be trained was explored. Because implicit learning of artificial letter strings generated from a finite-state grammar has been studied (Matthews et al., 1989; Reber, 1967; Reber et al., 1980) , performance on such a task could serve as a reasonable baseline against which to compare the successful induction of intuitive decision making.
We compared the level of recognition accuracy that was produced following passive exposure to vehicle sequences presented in our simulated environment with the level of recognition accuracy that was produced following memorization of artificial letter strings presented on a flat display (Reber, 1967) . These two conditions were part of a larger design that involved different types of training, stimuli, and displays. method Participants. We recruited 96 participants from Arizona State University and the surrounding community. Participants were naive as to the purpose of the study, and they were paid $30 for participation. All participants possessed normal or corrected-to-normal acuity, normal binocular vision, normal color vision, and normal phoria (Optec 2000/2300 vision tester, Stereo Optical Co., Chicago, IL). All participants gave documented informed consent.
Stimulus and apparatus. Sequences of vehicles, or strings of letters, were presented either on the ground of a simulated real-world environment or on a flat display. Vehicle sequences were composed of an SA-2 missile launcher, M109A tank, cargo truck, Scud transport truck, and flatbed truck ( The simulated real-world environment was presented as an expansive optic-flow field in which simulated participants flew through the environment and over vehicles or letters at a low altitude. Travel over the terrain was simulated with the use of a high-performance PC-based runtime system (Virtual Reality Scene Generator, MetaVR, Brookline, MA). Simulated altitude of flight was 15 m and its speed was 250 m/s, which corresponded to a simulated 559 mph, consistent with the speed of commercial and business aircraft (jets). At the altitude of 15 m, the global optical flow rate was 37.3 eye heights per second. This value was comparable to that encountered at highway speeds (i.e., 83 mph) when an individual travels sitting in a car at an altitude of 1 m.
A range of speeds of simulated locomotion was investigated during preliminary data collection. Implicit learning could be induced at speeds slower and faster than those reported above. We chose the speed reported above because it made each experimental session last about 1 hr per participant. Our results, however, were not dependent on that particular value of speed.
Flat display. A light gray background was presented on the flat display, which approximated the display used by Reber (1967) . Vehicles or letters were placed in a horizontal row. In terms of visual subtense, center-to-center spacing was either 1.3 arcdeg (letters) or 3.1 arcdeg (objects), which corresponded to an edge-to-edge spacing of 0.75 arcdeg (letters) or 0.5 to 1.5 arcdeg (objects) (Figure 1 , Panels C and D). Average visual subtense of the letters on the flat display was 0.45 (H) by 0.65 arcdeg (V). Average visual subtense of the objects was 2.35 arcdeg (H) by 0.77 arcdeg (V). All vehicles and letters were clearly identifiable. Vehicles, letters, and background were generated on the flat display via the same software used to generate the terrain imagery.
The simulated real-world display and the flat display were generated on a 50-in. plasma TV. The visual subtense of the TV display was 55 arcdeg (H) by 33 arcdeg (V). Average luminance of the TV display ranged from 41.7 cd/m 2 to 48.9 cd/m 2 , the precise value of which depended on the particular stimulus being presented. Displays were viewed from a distance of 114 cm. Test responses by the participant were recorded electronically via a button box.
Design and procedure. Two displays (simulated real-world vs. flat), two types of stimuli (vehicles vs. letters), and three types of training (passive vs. memorize vs. none) were factorially combined to create a 2 × 2 × 3 betweensubjects factorial design with a total of 12 conditions (Figure 1 , Panels A through D). There were 8 participants in each condition.
Training phase. In the passive training condition, each participant passively viewed a given vehicle sequence, or a given letter string, on either the simulated real-world display or the flat display. Participants were not instructed to learn anything, were not told where to direct their attention, did not receive feedback, and were not told that they would be tested at a later point in time, as mentioned earlier; thus they knew nothing about the task at the time of training. At the end of passive training, we asked the participants what they were doing during the training. Some participants reported that they just watched the display; some reported that they tried to count or label the objects; a few participants noticed a pattern among the sequences (e.g., the sequences seemed to start with a given object). In the memorize training condition, each participant was instructed to memorize, with feedback, the vehicle sequences or letter strings presented on either the simulated real-world display or the flat display (memorizing letter strings on the flat display was Reber's [1967] replication condition). We did not have to omit anyone for taking too long to memorize the sequences or strings. In the notraining condition, participants received no training before being tested.
To compare performance across different conditions, it was important to keep the amount of time spent training, 27 min, constant (except, of course, for the no-training condition). For the Reber (1967) replication condition, each participant memorized, with feedback, a given block of three unique letter strings such that the participant could perfectly reproduce each of the three strings twice before moving onto the next block of three strings. On average, our participants took 4.5 min to memorize one block of three letter strings. A total of six blocks was presented, which collectively took 27 min to be memorized on the average. Thus, there was a total of 18 unique letter strings memorized during training in a 27-min period. An analogous method was employed for the memorization of object sequences.
For the passive training condition (in which there was no feedback), three unique vehicle sequences or letter strings were presented 16 times each, which constituted one block of 48 trials. In a sense, we equated 16 passive presentations with the time taken to memorize each letter string. (Each trial involving a given sequence or string lasted 5 s, with an intertrial interval of about 0.6 s.) Each block took 4.5 min to complete. There was a total of six blocks presented, which collectively took 27 min to complete (and a total of 288 sequences presented during training). Thus, there was a total of 18 unique sequences or strings presented during passive training in a 27-min period, which was equivalent to the memorize condition.
Test phase. During each subsequent test trial, the participant viewed either vehicle sequences or test strings presented either in the simulated real-world environment or on the flat display. Different test trials were composed of different object sequences or letter strings that were determined by either (a) new paths taken through the same finite-state grammar or (b) a random ordering. The participants' task was to recognize whether each test sequence or string was "structured" like the training trials or "unstructured" (randomly ordered). Recognition accuracy was the measure of interest. Participants viewed the same type of stimuli and display during testing that was viewed during training.
There was no feedback during the test. We presented 88 sequences or strings: 22 sequences or strings were novel but drawn from the same finite-state grammar as the training ones, and 22 sequences or strings were randomly ordered. Each sequence was presented twice. Order of presentation of the test sequences or strings was random.
During debriefing following the test phase, many participants had trouble verbalizing the basis for their decisions. Some participants spontaneously mentioned that their decisions were based on a feeling "in the gut" or "on a hunch." On occasion, several participants mentioned one or two stimulus features on which they based some of their decisions, and these stimulus features were ones that were correctly mapped to our grammar. These responses were consistent with the nature of implicit learning and intuitive decision making (Klein, 1998; Polanyi, 1966) .
results
The two types of training, passive and memorize, produced an equivalent level of recognition accuracy that was significantly greater than that produced by the no-training condition (the latter of which was not significantly greater than chance), as shown in Figure 3 . A 2 × 2 × 3 between-subjects ANOVA revealed that there was a significant main effect of training type, F(2, 84) = 90.402, p < .001. Tukey's HSD test showed that both the passive training condition and the memorize training condition produced significantly higher accuracy scores than did the notraining condition (both p < .05), but there was no significant difference between the two training conditions (p > .05).
There was a significant main effect of stimulus type, F(1, 84) = 6.509, p = .013. Objects yielded higher accuracy than letters. There was no significant main effect of display type Passive exposure to the object sequences in our simulated environment (fifth bar from the left in Panel A of Figure 3 ) produced a level of recognition accuracy that was equivalent to that produced by effortful memorization of letter strings with feedback (fourth bar from the left in Panel B of Figure 3) . A nearly equivalent level of performance was produced in all training modes, stimulus types, and display types, provided that the participants were tested for decision making in the same conditions in which they were trained.
ExpErImEnt 2
The question of whether working memory plays a role in the training of intuitive decision making was investigated. We imposed a working memory load during the training of intuitive decision making by using an articulatory suppression task, a manipulation that should have interrupted the rehearsal mechanism of the phonological loop of working memory (Baddeley, 1986) . We also examined the effect of varying the complexity of the finite-state grammar to determine whether its effect would interact with that of articulatory suppression. method Stimuli. Object sequences were presented in the simulated real-world environment. Objects used were a house, tree, barn, tank, and a flatbed truck (figure not shown). Participants were tested with the same stimuli (object sequences) and display (simulated environment) on which they were trained.
Design and procedure. To manipulate articulatory suppression, participants either passively observed the object sequences during training as before (no suppression condition) or verbally repeated the days of the week out loud during training (suppression condition). To vary grammar complexity, two grammars were employed. One grammar (simple) contained five states and two arcs emanating from each state, and its topological entropy was 0.83 (Knowlton & Squire, 1994) . The other grammar (complex) contained eight states and three arcs emanating from each state, and its topological entropy was 1.02 ( figure not shown) . For the second experiment, 12 new participants served in each condition of this 2 × 2 between-subjects design. The passive training regime was used.
results
Articulatory suppression decreased recognition accuracy relative to no suppression, and greater grammar complexity also decreased accuracy, as shown in Figure 4 . A 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA revealed that there was a significant main effect of articulatory suppression, F(1, 44) = 5.64, p < .05; recognition accuracy was impaired when suppression was used. There was also a significant main effect of grammar complexity, F (1, 44) = 5.65, p < .05; accuracy was impaired with the complex grammar relative to the simple grammar. There was no significant interaction between articulatory suppression and grammar complexity (p > .05).
Training intuitive decision making suffers to a modest degree when the phonological loop of working memory is inhibited by an articulatory suppression task. The overall decrement produced by articulatory suppression was about 10%. Nonetheless, intuitive decision making could still be trained in all four conditions, including the conditions involving the eightstate, three-arc ("complex") grammar, because all means in Figure 4 were significantly greater than chance level (p < .05). This result is consistent with the conclusion offered in the next section, namely, that individuals can learn grammars whose topological entropy is as high as h = 1.2 (the entropy of the complex grammar was 1.02).
ExpErImEnt 3
We investigated the question of whether implicit learning possesses an informationprocessing limit that could be measured by examining the effects of grammar complexity. Stimuli. Object sequences were presented in our simulated real-world environment. Objects used were six vehicles and four buildings: barn, SA-2 missile launcher, fire station, M109A tank, stucco house, cargo truck, farm house, Scud transport truck, Chinook helicopter, and flatbed truck. Participants were tested with the same stimuli and display on which they were trained.
Design and procedure. The number of states in the grammar was 6 or 18, and the number of arcs emanating from each state was two or four, which created a 2 × 2 within-subjects factorial design. Topological entropy for these grammars was h = 0.5864 (6 states, two arcs), h = 1.2105 (6 states, four arcs), h = 0.6596 (18 states, two arcs), and h = 1.3361 (18 states, four arcs). See Figure 5 . For the third experiment, 8 new participants served in all conditions. Order of presentation of the conditions was determined by a Latin square design. The passive training regime was used.
results
Increasing grammar complexity by increasing the number of states decreased recognition accuracy (Figure 6) . A 2 × 2 within-subjects ANOVA showed that there was a significant main effect of number of states, F(1, 7) = 17.61, p < .01. The 18-state algorithm produced a lower level of learning than did the 6-state algorithm, consistent with the results of Experiment 2. There was no significant main effect of number of arcs, F(1, 7) = 3.0, p > .05, and no significant interaction between number of states and number of arcs, F(1, 7) = 0.15, p > .05.
Intuitive decision making could be developed, to a modest level, with a 6-state grammar with four arcs and a topological entropy of h = 1.2105 because all means shown in Figure 6 were significantly greater than chance (p < .05) except for the mean of the 18-state, four-arc condition whose entropy was h = 1.3361. We conclude that intuitive decision making can be trained with grammars whose topological entropy is as high as h = 1.2, but not higher, with our passive training paradigm.
ExpErImEnt 4
The question of whether learning via passive exposure to object sequences in our simulated real-world environment could transfer to decisions made about letter strings presented on the static flat display was investigated. The question of whether learning via memorization of letter strings on the static flat display could transfer to decisions made about object sequences in the simulated environment was also examined. method Stimuli. Object sequences were presented in our simulated environment, and letter strings were presented on the flat display. The 5 objects and 5 letters used were the same as those employed in Experiment 1. Participants were tested with stimuli and a display that were different from those on which they were trained.
Design and procedure. The passive regime was used for training with the object sequences in the simulated environment, which was then followed by testing with letter strings on the flat display (objects-to-letters condition). Memorization was employed for training with the letter strings on the flat display, which was then Figure 4 . Results of Experiment 2. Percentage correct recognition performance for two levels of articulatory suppression (none, suppression) and for two levels of algorithmic complexity, simple and complex. The simple algorithm's topological entropy was 0.83, and the complex algorithm's topological entropy was 1.02. Each bar represents the mean of 12 participants; error bars depict ±1 standard error of the mean.
followed by testing with object sequences in the simulated environment (letters-to-objects condition). These two conditions constituted a single-factor within-subjects design, with the same 8 new participants serving in both conditions. Order of the conditions was counterbalanced across participants.
results
Transfer of training was significantly greater in the objects-to-letters condition than in the letters-to-objects condition (Figure 7) . A t test revealed that recognition performance in the objects-to-letters condition was significantly higher than the performance in the letters-toobjects condition, t(8) = 4.15, p = .003.
Learning resulting from passive exposure to object sequences in the simulated environment showed complete transfer to decisions made about letter strings on the flat display. Learning resulting from memorization of letter strings on the flat display showed little transfer to decisions made about object sequences in the simulated environment.
GEnEral dIscussIon
Training with passive exposure to situational patterns in a simulated real-world environment can induce implicit learning, which creates a foundation for intuitive decision making. This result is consistent with suggestions that implicit learning plays a causal role in the development of intuitive decision making (Hogarth, 2001; Reber, 1989 Reber, , 1993 .
Articulatory suppression degraded the training of intuitive decision making. Because performing the articulatory suppression task should have imposed a load on the phonological loop of working memory, this result suggests that learning the artificial grammar under nonsuppression conditions involved, to some degree, working memory. Thus multiple cognitive processes were likely engaged when intuitive decision making was induced in our simulated environment.
Intuitive decision making was degraded when trained with the more complex grammar, consistent with previous studies (e.g., van den Bos & Poletiek, 2008) . From our results, we derived an estimate of the information-processing limit for training intuitive decision making, which was h = 1.2. This limit was obtained in conditions whereby our participants experienced an "unsupervised" learning situation akin to naturalistic learning.
This result would seem to imply that humans should be limited in their ability to learn situational patterns of high complexity. Yet in the real world, life frequently consists of a continuous stream of situational patterns that would likely entail many more states and potential transitions between them than those studied here. In the real world, it is likely that humans mentally chunk the content of such patterns into smaller, more manageable units on the basis of the meaning of the chunks. This process would occur so that naturalistic learning could proceed unencumbered.
Training of intuitive decision making in our simulated environment completely transferred to a very different type of stimulus (static flat display), which would be considered "far" transfer (Barnett & Ceci, 2002) . Previous studies have also reported significant transfer of artificial grammar learning when a different letter set (presented on a flat display) was used during testing than was used for training (Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Knowlton & Squire, 1996; Matthews et al., 1989; Reber, 1969) . However, the complete transfer of learning from object sequences in the simulated environment to letter strings on the flat display should have presented an even greater challenge for transfer.
Transfer in our conditions would seem to pose a problem for transfer-appropriate processing (Bransford, Franks, Morris, & Stein, 1979; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977) in which retention and recall of knowledge requires a close match between the contextual cues present during encoding and retrieval. However, transfer-appropriate processing (Bransford et al., 1979; Morris et al., 1977) applies to declarative memory, and the implicit learning that occurred in the present study would be mediated by procedural memory (Knowlton, Ramus, & Squire, 1992) . Procedural memory represents invariant patterns extracted from separate events (Squire, 2004 (Squire, , 2009 .
The high level of far transfer of training likely occurred because the encoding processes attendant to procedural memory became more fully engaged with the simulated cues in our Figure 7 . Results of Experiment 4. Percentage correct recognition performance for two types of transfer conditions. The letters-to-objects condition refers to training involving the memorization of letter strings presented on the flat display and testing with object sequences presented in the simulated real-world environment. The objects-to-letters condition refers to training involving the passive viewing of object sequences presented in the simulated real-world environment and testing with letter strings presented on the flat display. Each bar represents the mean of 8 participants; error bars depict ±1 standard error of the mean. naturalistic scene. A more meaningful representation can be made of a naturalistic scene than of an impoverished display. The more meaningful representation may have provided for a greater depth of encoding and processing, along the lines of the classic depth-of-processing argument found with declarative memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975; Roediger, Gallo, & Geraci, 2002; Rose, Myerson, Roediger, & Hale, 2010) . Thus, we are making an analogous depth-of-processing argument for procedural memory.
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KEy poInts
• Intuitive decision making can be developed via implicit learning.
• Articulatory suppression exerted a significant inhibitory effect on the training of intuitive decision making. • The information-processing limit for developing intuitive decision making was h = 1.2.
• Intuitive decision making developed in the simulated environment fully transferred to a flat display (but not vice versa). 
